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Abstract 
The rise of sound-bite news is one of the most widely bemoaned findings in political 
communication research. Yet, the detrimental effects of this trend have been more assumed 
than demonstrated. This study examines one consequence of sound-bite journalism: the 
creation of incomplete argument, in which speakers presenting their political position in the 
news do not also justify it. Drawing on data about television news in Germany, Russia, and 
the United States, it shows that shrinking sound bites consistently reduce the probability of 
opinion justification across widely differing national contexts. Sound-bite journalism emerges 
as harmful to television news' ability to produce public justification. 
Keywords: Sound-bite journalism; TV news; news quality; justification; public discourse; 
mediated deliberation
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The Impact of Sound-Bite Journalism on Public Argument 
Critics have long charged television news with not providing politicians sufficient time to 
articulate their positions on issues and argue their points, thus producing a largely fragmented, 
journalist-centered public discourse (e.g., Bennett, 2009; Lichter, 2001; Patterson, 1993). 
Systematic evidence of the shrinking sound bite in television news first appeared in the 
United States (Adatto, 1990; Hallin, 1992), and since has been established as one of the most 
replicable findings in the U.S. (e.g., Farnsworth & Lichter, 2011) and other national contexts 
including Australia, France, Germany, and the U.K. (e.g., Esser, 2008; Schulz & Zeh, 2007; 
Young, 2008). In the U.S., the average politician sound bite in election campaign news has 
shrunk from 43 seconds in 1968 (Hallin, 1992) to about 9 seconds in 1992, a level at which it 
has stabilized since (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2011). 
However, although scholars are often damning in their assessment of sound-bite 
journalism, little systematic empirical research exists on the actual substantive costs 
associated with sound-bite journalism. Normative assessments of sound-bite journalism thus 
largely remain what Althaus (2012, p. 97) refers to as unsubstantiated “normative assertions.”
 This study addresses this problem and provides a more empirically saturated 
normative assessment of sound-bite news. In particular, it proposes that an important and 
likely consequence of shrinking sound bites on television news is the emergence of 
incomplete argument, in which speakers presenting their opinion on a political issue are less 
likely to also get to justifying it while on air. The article first summarizes the scholarly 
discourse regarding the empirical evidence and normative assessment of sound-bite news. It 
then introduces opinion justification as a central component of political argument in general 
and mediated deliberation in particular. After establishing the normative value of justification, 
it discusses theoretical grounds for expecting a detrimental effect of sound-bite news on the 
occurrence of opinion justification on the news, and the expectation that it is particularly 
pronounced for non-journalist speakers. The study then tests these expectations using a cross-
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national, multi-level analysis of justification in television news in three countries: Germany, 
Russia, and the United States. In the process, it shows that shrinking sound bites have a 
significant negative effect on the probability of opinion justification, but also this effect is 
robust across national contexts and generally more pronounced for non-journalist speakers 
than journalists speaking on the news. Ultimately, sound-bite journalism emerges from the 
analyses as largely deleterious to television news’ ability to produce public justification. 
Sound-Bite News 
The literature suggests several factors are responsible for a near-universal decline in 
uninterrupted speech in television news in late modern Western democracies. These factors 
include technological advances in editing (Hallin, 1992) and increasing competitive pressures 
on television stations (Patterson, 1993, p. 159). The latter has resulted in greater journalist 
interventionism, a move towards a more arousing and vivid, fast-paced style of reporting that 
does not anymore provide a space for the lengthy development of complex arguments on 
complicated issues (Patterson, 1993). Sound-bite news may also be a byproduct of journalists’ 
attempts to regain control over their product in the face of increased professionalized 
communication strategies on the part of political actors. This journalistic “fight-back” (Zaller, 
1999) results in a more fast-paced, journalist-centered style of reporting that leaves little room 
for non-journalist speakers to expound their views in longer segments of uninterrupted speech 
(Esser, 2008, p. 417). 
Media interventionism can be seen as part of the general mediatization of politics, a 
process in which the influence of the media increases relative to actors from the political 
system (e.g., Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999). In this view, shorter segments of uninterrupted non-
journalist speech on television news exemplify how media content is governed by a distinct 
“media logic” (Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011, p. 35). Indeed research shows that sound bites 
tend to be shorter on for-profit television stations where commercial pressures and mediatized 
reporting are more pronounced (Esser, 2008; Lichter, 2001). 
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 For the most part, academic commentators have expressed concern over these 
developments. Although some maintain that longer sound bites would not necessarily entail a 
more democratically valuable news discourse (Stephens, 1996), or even that the rise of sound-
bite journalism has elevated, not diminished, the importance of public speech (Foley, 2012), 
the general sense among scholars seems to be that there is something fundamentally wrong 
with sound-bite journalism. While these concerns are often not very explicit, the underlying 
sentiment showing through is that the fast-paced, fragmented style of political speech 
produced by such journalism vitiates the possibility of a sufficiently information-rich news 
product (e.g., Bennett, 2009, p. 179). For example, Kathleen Hall Jamieson writes: 
The notion that the end of rhetoric is judgment presupposes that rhetoric consists of 
argument—statement and proof. Morselized ads and news bites consist instead of 
statement alone, a move that invites us to judge the merit of the claim on the ethos of 
the speaker or the emotional appeals (pathos) enwrapping the claim. In the process, 
appeal to reason (logos)—one of Aristotle’s prime artistic means of persuasion—is 
lost. (1988, p. 240) 
Similarly, Whaley and Holloway (1997, p. 294) note that “argument,” in the traditional sense, 
has become a rare feature of public political discourse. 
In sum, the empirical evidence clearly suggests decreases in sound-bite lengths and 
their stabilization on low levels in a wide range of countries. Some studies have investigated 
the antecedents of shrinking sound bites (Esser, 2008), others their effects on citizens 
(Donsbach & Jandura, 2003; Russomanno & Everett, 1995). Quite surprisingly though, no 
larger-scale study has yet investigated whether the “degradation of coverage” (Farnsworth & 
Lichter, 2011, p. 26) generally assumed to be associated with sound-bite journalism actually 
exists and, if so, the magnitude of the “problem of sound bites” (Patterson, 1993, p. 160). As 
this study shows, sound-bite journalism provides citizens with consistently less information 
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about the reasons political actors draw on to justify their actions, leaving them less well-
equipped to make up their minds about political issues based on substantive reasons. 
The Role of Justification for Democratic Public Discourse 
The “substance” that is supposed to suffer from sound-bite news (e.g., Lichter, 2001, 
p. 23) is not often specified in the literature and thus notions of what exactly it is that may 
lack in such news necessarily remain vague. One particularly important substantive 
component of news discourse can be found in the justification of political opinions. This 
section briefly explains why justification is a central component of a democratic public 
discourse from both a normative and an empirical point of view. The next section argues that 
it is precisely this feature of television news discourse that is particularly affected as the 
duration of sound bites shrinks. 
As a communicative phenomenon, justification relates to the normative role of news 
journalism. Indeed, the production and dissemination of political justifications can be 
considered a fundamental part of that role (Ettema, 2007). Public justification is central to 
most liberal models of democracy (Chambers, 2010), with theories of deliberative democracy 
in particular emphasizing its value for democratic life. From this theoretical perspective, the 
normative value of public justification derives from both its cognitive-epistemic and social-
moral functions. 
In cognitive-epistemic terms, the public circulation of justifications for political ideas 
is valuable because it creates for citizens the kind of transparency and intelligibility of the 
world around them necessary to exercise autonomous political judgment (Waldron, 1993, p. 
58). Public and contestable justifications are also expected to make it more likely that the 
democratic process will produce reasonable policy outcomes, which increases its legitimacy 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 413). In social-moral terms, the public justification of political ideas can 
be understood as necessary for realizing a principle of mutual respect for persons (Larmore, 
1999) or even a principle of justice per se (Forst, 2012). 
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Public justification thus is a normatively significant demand towards political 
communication in liberal models of democracy, especially those of a deliberative bent. The 
question of whether sound-bite journalism impacts the degree to which justification can 
transpire in the news therefore has clear normative import. 
One important aspect of the normative social-moral and a cognitive-epistemic 
arguments for public justification is that its mere presence is a requirement for the realization 
of both its epistemic and moral ends. From an epistemic perspective, more public justification 
will generally be preferable over less justification because public justification invites public 
contestation and criticism that may not otherwise have occurred. Additionally, it is precisely 
the self-corrective capacities of public discourse to separate good from bad public reasons that 
makes it so attractive to deliberative theorists (Habermas, 1992, p. 458, 2006, p. 416). From a 
social-moral perspective as well, public justification is a normative good per se, since the 
provision of reasons to affected others corresponds to their basic right to be respected as 
autonomous moral persons (Forst, 1999, p. 40).1 
In addition, empirical research suggests that people’s opinion formation may be more 
deliberative when they frequently encounter justifications in public discourse. Justifications 
given for opinions presented on the news may function as cognitive cues that prime viewers to 
engage in more thoughtful reasoning. “Reflective cues” can induce greater cognitive effort, 
influence the importance citizens attach to having reasons for one’s political opinions 
(Manosevitch, 2009; see also Hwang, Gotlieb, Nah, & McLeod, 2007) and may even prompt 
more deliberative behaviors (Manosevitch, Steinfeld, & Lev-On, 2014). Similarly, research in 
small-group deliberation has shown that as citizens get exposed to more reasons for different 
opinions they become more likely to revisit their own positions in their light (Schneiderhan & 
Khan, 2008). 
Observing opinion justification on the news may shift citizens’ focus to positive social 
norms related to rational, reasoned thinking and discussion, and prime reflective behaviors in 
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them. The the mere presence of public justification of political opinions is not only central to 
contemporary normative accounts of democracy, but also has “hard” empirical benefits for 
individuals’ opinion formation. 
Television news is a particularly important and consequential site of public 
justification as it still is the most important source of political information for the most people 
in most countries (see Papathanassopoulos et al., 2013). This is also true because both 
journalists and politicians have considerable incentives to present justifications in the news. 
Journalists should be motivated to produce public justification in their news products out of 
professional ideals such as to “keep people informed” (e.g., Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001) and 
pursue “journalism as reason-giving” (Ettema, 2007). Political actors, on the other hand, 
should be motivated to engage in justification on the news when confronted with demands to 
justify their standpoint by journalists or political competitors (Peters, 2008, p. 239). 
Television news is therefore a highly probable and relevant public space for the 
production of public justifications, which play a normatively and empirically important role 
for democratic discourse. This idea has appeared in several studies of justification in the news 
(e.g., Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Gerhards, Neidhardt, & Rucht, 1998; Maia, 
2009; Renwick & Lamb, 2013; Rudd & Fish, 1989). However, this study is the first major 
undertaking to link political justification in the news to sound-bite journalism. 
The Role of Time for Justification in the News 
The temporal context of a news show likely has consequences for the probability with 
which it features justifications for presented opinions. In general, the temporal context of a 
newscast is the amount of airtime that is available for its distinct components. It can be 
differentiated into three levels, each corresponding to one of several nested content units that 
together form a complete newscast: the duration of the individual broadcast, the duration of an 
individual news item within a broadcast, and the duration of an individual utterance with a 
news item. These units will to some degree be related to one another. However, this study is 
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concerned with the direct effect of available time on justification in the news. Since the 
presence (or absence) of a justification is most proximally a feature of individual utterances 
(not of news items or entire broadcasts), this study focuses on the effects of utterance 
durations on the occurrence of opinion justification and brackets the length of news items and 
broadcasts.2 
Normative concerns over the possible impact of decreasing sound-bite lengths on 
substantive debate cannot be confirmed by studying sound bites in isolation. As mentioned 
above, sound-bite research has remained largely descriptive and has not looked at the 
consequences of shrinking sound bites.3 
A causal relation between the length of an utterance made on the news and the 
likelihood of it carrying a justification in addition to an opinion indeed has face validity for 
two reasons, one of them structural and one motivational. Regarding the structural basis of the 
time-justification relation, it is important to recognize that justification—and argumentation 
more generally—constitutes a relatively complex type of communicative structure. Proposing 
a justification makes sense only if there is something to be justified. A point of view, opinion, 
position or at any rate a claim to the rightness of some proposition has to be disclosed, 
explained, and expected to be understood before a speaker may reasonably proceed to 
justifying it by giving reasons for its validity (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 2).  
Justification thus is a posterior component in the basic structure of argumentative 
communication, which suggests that, under time constraints, it will be relatively likely to be 
either omitted by an anticipating speaker or cut out by a journalist packaging distinct 
statements into an integrated news item (Jamieson, 1988, p. 240). In fact, evidence suggests 
that journalists constructing the news disproportionately deselect justifications from the 
universe of potential information to be reported (Kuhlmann, 1999, p. 284). 
Regarding the motivational basis of the time-justification relation, it is reasonable to 
expect that the more time speakers are given to complete a statement without being cut off 
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after the presentation of their political position on an issue, the more likely they will try to 
defend it with a justification. For politicians (or otherwise interested actors) this is true 
because, like in most mass media forums, public contestation in television news exhibits a 
triadic structure that encourages the political actors to address the mass audience in an effort 
to win its support rather than talk to each other (Peters, 2008, p. 239). Although alternative 
means of crafting persuasive appeals (e.g., charm or various rhetorical devices) may be 
available, speakers will often use the time they are given in such a forum to produce 
justifications supporting their own point of view or criticizing alternative standpoints, thereby 
increasing the overall degree of justification-giving on the news. For journalists, it is 
reasonable to expect greater justification-giving with more time if the diversification of 
justifications and viewpoints is part of their internalized professional role conception or 
external professional demands held against them. Journalists also should tend to use 
additional speaking time for adding justifications to previously presented opinions.  
Nevertheless, journalists also have informational commitments that extend beyond the 
presentation of justification and will have more alternatives for using additional speaking time 
compared to other types of speakers (they could, for example, choose to create informational 
diversity by presenting a greater number of opinions instead of more justifications). The 
expectation therefore is that the positive association between available speaking time and 
justification probability will be lower for utterances made by journalists than for the direct 
utterances of non-journalistic speakers (“sound bites”). 
H1: The probability of an utterance presenting a political opinion to present a justification will 
be positively related to the duration of the utterance. 
H2: The probability to present a justification will be more strongly related to the duration of a 
direct utterance by a non-journalist speaker (sound bite) presenting a political opinion than to 
the duration of a direct utterance by a journalist presenting an opinion. 
Design and Methods 
SOUND-BITE JOURNALISM & PUBLIC ARGUMENT 11 
 
 
The data to test the above hypotheses were generated in a large-scale quantitative 
content analysis of the eleven main evening television news shows of ten national television 
channels in the United States, Germany, and the Russian Federation (see Online Appendix I 
for a detailed overview of the studied media sample).4. Because the theoretical rationale 
presented above is expected to hold universally across different national contexts, this study 
does not focus on the differences and comparisons between the three countries. However, as 
they cover widely differing types of formal democracies they allow for a hard test of the 
robustness of the hypothesized effects of utterance duration against the effects of social 
context: Germany represents a consensus democracy, the US represents a majoritarian 
democracy, and Russia represents a delegative (or: illiberal) democracy (Lijphart, 2012; 
Merkel, 2004).5 The TV channels were selected to include public-service, commercial, and 
(for Russia) state-controlled channels that were among those with the greatest market shares 
in their respective category. The sample also included both general-interest and news-only 
channels from each country to produce a sample of television news that is more generally 
representative than one including only channels in either category. 
The two Russian general-interest channels represent different levels of direct 
government influence: from 2009 to 2010, REN-TV still realized a requisite degree of 
independence from government control, and could be regarded as “semi-autonomous” at that 
time, while Pervy was under direct control by the state. The selected news-only television 
channels were either non-partisan (n-tv, CNN) or partisan (Fox News, R24) and the selected 
news programs included four in-depth news shows (CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360°, ARD-
Tagesthemen, PBS’s News Hour, and Fox News Channel’s Fox Report) next to traditional, 
fact-centered nightly news bulletins. 
The study analyzed newscast content worth of two constructed weeks from each 
channel, random-sampled from the six-months periods between October 1, 2009 and March 
31, 2010 and from April 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010. The sampled newscast content was 
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recorded and coded directly without reliance on transcripts. Importantly for this study, this 
allowed for the reliable coding of temporal information.  
Coding captured all newscasts in their entirety but since the focus of this study is on 
political justification, all analyses reported below include only news stories on primarily 
political topics (i.e., stories relating to a policy domain, politics, or other coverage related to a 
need for collectively binding decisions by political institutions). Stories that dealt with 
business, culture and science, society, sports, accidents, natural disasters, criminal cases, 
service news, lifestyle, and religion were excluded from the analysis. Further, since the focus 
of this study is on the justification of political opinion, all reported results are based on 
analyses of all utterances giving a subjective interpretation or opinion regarding a political 
issue. The analyses reported here thus included all utterances that contained interpretation or 
opinion in news items with a political topic. The analysis encompassed a total of 476 political 
news items with a cumulative duration of 17.2 hours. Of these, 329 news items were included 
because they contained at least one opinion-presenting utterance. Overall, the study included 
1,559 opinion utterances found in these 329 political news items. 
Variables used in this study were measured on three levels of analysis: the level of the 
utterance (Level 1), the level of the news item (Level 2), and the level of the individual 
broadcast (Level 3). 
An utterance was defined as a continuous speech act that contains a substantial 
statement. Utterances were differentiated into two categories: direct and quoted utterances. If 
a (direct) utterance contained a quote of another speaker, the quoted utterance was identified 
as a separate (quoted) utterance and all utterance-level variables coded separately for both the 
direct (quoting) and quoted utterance. Coders were allowed to code up to three quoted 
utterances per direct utterance; quoted utterances were coded in the order of their appearance. 
Whenever “utterances” is referred to below without giving a further qualification the term 
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encompasses both direct and quoted utterances. A total of ten variables were used in the 
analyses reported below. 
Justification. The dependent variable, opinion justification, was coded for all 
utterances (direct and quoted) containing interpretation or opinion. Coders first determined 
whether the utterance related to a position, objective, or action relevant to society (i.e., an 
attitude of “public” relevance that would therefore also be subject to the public justification 
requirements of liberal democratic theories). If so, they proceeded to deciding whether the 
societally relevant position, objective, or action was justified through some form of 
argumentative support. The coding protocol employed a low threshold for the identification of 
a justification. For example, the utterance “The government’s policies were successful, as 
they moved Germany forward” would have been classified as a position with justification, 
even if it was very brief and vague. The coding protocol thus used a liberal operationalization 
of opinion justification. By using an operationalization that does not demand a fully 
developed argument and captures also the condensed forms of argument typical of 
postmodern mediated discourse (see Aden, 1994), the coding provided for a hard test of the 
expectation that shorter statements of opinion are less likely to include justificatory support. 
In other words, reductions in opinion occurrence as measured by the coding instrument 
always indicated the complete absence of any uttered justification, not just the presence of 
some reduced form of argumentative support. The justification variable is a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of a justification for each utterance containing an actor’s political 
opinion (for coding and recoding details, see Online Appendix II). 
Utterance duration. The independent variable was captured by a stopwatch measure 
indicating the length of an uninterrupted sequence of speech, in seconds. 
Beyond the two focal variables, all content was also coded for six additional indicators 
of deliberative news content expected to influence the likelihood of opinion justification that 
figure as statistical controls in the models presented below. Civil society speaker measured 
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whether the speaker of the coded utterance belonged to belonged to (organized or 
unorganized) civil society; meta-deliberation measured whether an utterances referred to the 
nature, rules, or discursive meanings of a public debate; responsiveness measured whether the 
speaker of the coded utterance reacts to the substantial position/opinion of another speaker or 
actor; news item type measured the journalistic form of the coded news item (e.g., filmed 
report, interview, or journalist commentary); decision-relatedness measured whether the 
coded news item referred to a collectively binding political decision; and opposing positions 
measured whether speakers with opposing/contrary positions (expressed in separate 
utterances) were mentioned in the news item. Detailed information about the coding 
instructions given to coders and the recoding operations performed for each content indicator 
used as control variable in this paper is available in Online Appendix II. 
These content indicators, along with regression dummies representing national and 
organizational context differences, were included as statistical controls in the regression 
models presented below. The context variables controlled for baseline differences in the 
likelihood of justification presentation between the countries (DE, RU, US) and types of 
organization (public service, commercial, state controlled) studied. In this paper, these 
variables are not of substantive interest and results on their effects reported elsewhere. They 
are not explicated here due to space restrictions. However, they were included in the analysis 
to provide controls for systematic content differences between newscasts that could otherwise 
lead to spurious relationships of sound-bite length with justification likelihood.  
Coding was done by eight undergraduate and graduate student coders who underwent 
intensive, multi-wave coder training (approx. 50h per coder). The entire corpus of television 
material was coded twice by sets of two independent coders. Double-coding was reliable at > 
.7 using either kappa or alpha for all but three variables (topic, decision-relatedness and 
justification). However, the final data reflects coder agreement at a greater level since in a 
final coding step pairs of coders identified all coder disagreements and adjudicated them via 
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consensus decisions to further reduce error in the data (see Orwin & Vevea, 2009, p. 184).  
Detailed information about the quality of the data, including coder training, coding 
procedures, and intercoder reliabilities is available in Online Appendix III. 
In sampling terms, each newscast thus constitutes a cluster (Level 3) within which 
news items (Level 2) are nested. News items, in turn, form clusters within which individual 
utterances (Level 1) are nested. Treating hierarchical, multi-level data as single-level data 
runs the risk of producing biased estimates of effects and severely biased estimates of 
standard errors that, if uncorrected, will suggest greater confidence in the results than is 
warranted (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, p. 2). In order to produce unbiased parameter 
estimates and standard errors, the data were analyzed using logistic multilevel modeling 
(MLM, Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In addition to parameter estimates and statistical tests, 
the study presents predictive margins plots below. These plots display the predictive marginal 
probabilities of opinion justification. Predictive margins imply the average treatment effect 
(AME): for a continuous independent variable the AME is simply the average slope of the 
predicted probability curve shown in the plots (Long, 2014). 
Results 
The first step was to estimate an empty three-level model of opinion justification 
without any explanatory variables (Model 0, fit statistics in Table 1). The next step was to 
estimate a main effects model including all control variables and the indicator of sound-bite 
length, utterance duration (Model 1). Table 1 reports estimated logit coefficients and their 
standard errors, and the average marginal effects (AMEs) of utterance duration, as well as fit 
statistics (estimates for variables that are not of substantive interest here not shown). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Estimates for the empty model (Model 0) show that 7.3% of the total variance in opinion 
justification is due to differences between news items and 12.9% of the variance is due to 
differences between individual broadcasts. The remaining 79.8% is variance on the utterance 
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level. The likelihood for a political opinion of getting justified thus varies considerably 
between individual broadcasts and news items. An initial likelihood ratio test comparing the 
empty model with the corresponding standard single-level logit regression model supports this 
conclusion: The model fit of the multilevel model is significantly better than that of the 
corresponding single-level modelȤ2(2) = 100.35, p < .000. The data thus support the notion 
that opinion justification in the news should be treated as a multilevel phenomenon, even 
when looking at its communicative context only. 
Model 1 includes the effect of an opinion utterance’s duration on the probability of 
justification. Hypothesis 1 predicted that longer opinion-presenting sound bites would, on 
average, be more likely to include a justification for the opinion presented. The data strongly 
supported this expectation: The more time a speaker had at her disposal to present a political 
opinion, the more likely she was to also present a justification for it. This effect was highly 
significant and robust against all other controls, z = 6.23, p < .000. The average marginal 
effect of utterance duration across all observations indicates that for every ten seconds added 
to an opinion statement, the probability of opinion justification rose by an average four 
percentage points. The left-hand panel of Figure 1 illustrates the strongly positive overall 
effect of utterance duration across all opinion utterances in the studied samples. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Note that the analysis thus far combined both direct (“primary”) and quoted utterances by 
journalists and non-journalistic speakers. It thus provides an overview of all opinion 
presentation happening in the news, including journalists’ presentation of other actors’ 
opinions and justifications (for example when journalists provide a summary of a debate). 
However, Hypothesis 2 predicted that an increase in available time for an uninterrupted block 
of speech will raise the probability of justification more for non-journalistic speakers 
appearing on the news than for journalists. In other words, utterance duration was expected to 
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matter more for justification in opinion-presenting sound bites than in opinion-presenting 
journalistic speech. 
To test this interaction hypothesis, this study estimated a re-specified version of Model 
1. This new model, Model 2, differed from Model 1 in two ways: First, it used an alternative 
indicator for type of speaker that distinguishes between journalists and non-journalistic 
speakers instead of central and civil society speakers. Second, a multiplicative term 
representing the interaction between speaker type (journalistic vs. non-journalistic) and 
utterance duration was included into the model. The results provide strong support for 
Hypothesis 2 (Table 1). First, the main effect of speaker type shows that journalists, overall, 
are much less likely to provide justifications for opinions they present (either their own or 
others’). The AME suggests that, on average, this justification probability gap between 
journalists and non-journalists on the news amounts to 23 percentage points and is statistically 
significant, z = -8.83, p < .001.6 
More important in terms of the hypothesis is the interaction of journalistic speakers 
and utterance duration. Its effect is highly significant and negative, indicating that the positive 
effect of utterance length on justification probability is lower for journalists than for non- 
journalists. The average marginal effect for this interaction suggests that the difference in 
justification probability between journalists and non-journalists grows by an average seven 
percentage points every ten seconds. The right-hand panel of Figure 1 shows the predicted 
probabilities of justification for journalists and non-journalist speakers and illustrates both the 
general justification gap between the two groups and the magnitude of the difference in how 
the available time leads them to engage in opinion justification. A 30-second opinion 
statement by a non-journalist has more than a 70 percent probability of being accompanied by 
a justification; an opinion-presenting statement of the same length coming from a journalist 
only has a probability of a little more than 30 percent to come with a justification. Speakers 
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who are not journalists clearly are more inclined to use additional speaking time given to them 
to provide justifications. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The data thus indicate a strongly positive effect of sound-bite length on justification 
probability across the sample. But how robust is it? Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities 
of justification in opinion utterances by non-journalists (i.e., sound bites) as a function of their 
duration for Germany, Russian, and the United States: Inspection of the display shows that the 
duration effect is indeed robust and occurs across national contexts. Although some cross-
national variation exists, and confidence intervals widen due to the lower number of 
observations (especially for longer utterances in Germany), the trend is as expected: In each 
country, longer utterances are more likely to provide at least one justification for a presented 
opinion and the effect thus appears to be a fairly universal, transnational phenomenon. Some 
cross-national variation is apparent regarding the shape of the probability curve: While 
increases in justification probability with greater uninterrupted speaking time are highest for 
sound bites of up to 25 seconds in U.S. newscasts, in Russia (and to a somewhat lesser extent 
in Germany) the slope of the probability curve is steepest at about 45 seconds. In the U.S., 
speakers in the news get to, or are pushed to, deliver justifications quickly; in Russia an 
opinion utterance must be much longer to also present a justification—which, of course, 
lowers the overall level of justification in the news, as had become evident in the cross-
national comparison. 
In sum, this study finds that the effect of utterance duration on justification probability 
is strongly positive, robust across national contexts, and more pronounced for sound bites of 
non-journalistic speakers than journalists.  
Discussion 
The public justification of political alternatives is the lifeblood of democracy. Whether 
television news discourse is vibrant and filled with public justification or quiescent and 
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emptied of political justification is important because public justification is both normatively 
and empirically central to achieving the epistemic and social-moral ends of democracy. 
This study examined the effects of sound-bite length on justification in the news – 
namely, the consequences of time available to speakers on the news on their probability to go 
beyond presenting their opinion on an issue and instead also justify it. The purpose of this 
analysis was to assess the actual substantive cost of the oft-bemoaned rise of “sound bite 
news” (Hallin, 1992) for citizen audiences. Observers have frequently deplored this 
development in television news, pointing to outcomes such as loss in substance and increased 
journalist domination of the news product (Lichter, 2001). But few studies actually 
investigated this empirical expectation. 
The proposition tested in this study was that such public justification for political 
opinions will disappear from television news as sound bites shrink, due mainly to the basic 
structure of argumentative communication, in which the justification of standpoints occupies 
a posterior position (Jamieson, 1988), but also due to the general incentives for and 
motivation of speakers on the news to use additional speaking time for justifying their stances. 
More specifically, this study expected that non-journalist speakers will generally be more 
inclined than journalists to use additional on-air seconds to present justifications for political 
standpoints.  
The analyses presented here produced evidence of the real substantive costs of sound-
bite journalism. Longer opinion-presenting utterances, irrespective of who made them, were 
significantly more likely to contain a justification for the political standpoints expressed. 
Further analysis showed that uninterrupted speaking time mattered more for the likelihood of 
justification if the speaker was not a journalist. In other words, “sound-bitten” external 
speakers indeed showed a greater tendency to use additional speaking time for justification. 
Independent analyses in the German, Russian, and the U.S. contexts indicated that the 
chilling consequences of short sound bites for the degree of opinion justification are a fairly 
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universal phenomenon. The three national contexts studied here differ widely, which put to a 
hard test the theoretical expectation of sound-bite news leading to incomplete argument. The 
empirical results indicate that shrinking utterance durations universally diminish the amount 
of justification for political opinions appearing in television news largely irrespective of social 
context. 
These findings have implications for multiple literatures in communication. By 
uncovering a harmful consequence of sound-bite journalism they provide grounds for a 
renewed, evidence-based critique of the conditions responsible for the near-universal trend of 
shrinking sound bites in television news. Scholars like Bennett have long argued that modern 
communication technologies and corporate profit motives combine to produce “generic, 
‘lowest-common-denominator’ information formats” (2009, p. 40) that are biased towards 
fragmented and dramatized news content that leaves little room for principled political 
argument. If market-based models of news production shape news products such that they 
appeal to the widest possible audience at the smallest possible cost to producers (e.g., 
Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994), and if this leads to sensationalism (Slattery, Doremus, & 
Marcus, 2001), horserace coverage (Iyengar, Norpoth, & Hahn, 2004), and sound-bite news 
(Esser, 2008), the present study provides empirical evidence in support of a case against 
purely market-based models of media production. 
In line with how shrinking sound bites stem, in part, from journalists’ increasingly 
interventionist orientations (Esser, 2008, p. 404; also Zaller, 1999) and a general move from 
“sacerdotal” to “interpretive” journalism (Salgado & Strömbäck, 2012), the findings 
presented here show that ever shorter segments of uninterrupted speech are more problematic 
with regard to the information value of politicians’ and other non-journalists’ utterances vis-à-
vis those of journalists. By implication, they should caution against risks regarding the 
justificatory quality of television news that accords a more prominent and evaluative role in 
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news coverage to the producing journalists (on interpretive journalism, see Salgado & 
Strömbäck, 2012). 
Beyond the critique of news production processes, the findings of this study may have 
implications for partisan polarization in news audiences and the processes by which they form 
their individual political preferences. Today’s media environment is highly fragmented and 
features a rising number of sometimes highly partisan media. This new landscape may 
diminish the ability even of mainstream newscasts to let audiences attend to truly 
argumentative exchanges and reciprocal justification between opposed political camps, which 
may make polarization based on partisan elite cues more likely and promote the projection of 
elite-level polarization—on the upswing since the 1990s (Hetherington, 2001)—onto the 
general public. 
If political elites are given less opportunity to explain and justify their opinion it may 
also be more difficult for voters to accurately identify the substantive positions of parties and 
candidates. In that way, sound-bite news could not only inhibit in viewers the formation of 
well-reasoned policy opinions but also undermine their elective affinities with specific parties 
and candidates that match their own political preferences. Sound-bite news may thus 
contribute to a less effective and rational “partisan sort” (Levendusky, 2009). 
While this study expected the hypothesized associations to hold largely independent of 
social context, it is still important to keep in mind the differences in the political and media 
systems between the studied countries in making sense of the empirical findings. Opinion 
justification in television news may suffer from shrinking sound bites everywhere, but the 
degree to which this makes a difference for the democratic quality of public discourse is likely 
to vary with the political context. For example, the data on opinion presentation gathered for 
this study show that Russian newscasts were clearly the least inclined to present political 
opinion, generally trailing behind the U.S. and German stations. Of course, if news discourse 
is depoliticized or “empty,” in that it does not often feature a lively exchange of political 
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opinions and is dominated by state and ruling-party representatives, it will be less relevant in 
absolute and normative terms for the overall quality of public debate if the opinions that are 
presented in the news are justified or not. In this sense, the negative effect of sound-bite news 
on opinion justification is more democratically detrimental in an entrenched liberal 
democracy like the U.S. than in a defective democracy like Russia. 
Before concluding, it is important to note as a limitation that this study did not 
measure instances in which a speaker presented her opinion in one utterance and justified it in 
another, subsequent one. While no clear evidence suggests this, if instances of such “scattered 
justification” were to occur frequently on television news, sound-bite journalism would 
become less problematic for public justification. 
As a general implication, this study points to a need for communication scholarship to 
investigate closely the normatively important outcomes expected from the communication 
phenomena of interest. The study provides such an empirical normative assessment: It 
demonstrates how an oft-bemoaned but never-studied outcome of journalistic routines 
associated with media commercialism and concomitant content biases diminishes the 
contribution that television news can make to democratic discourse. Importantly, this 
assessment was not based on ad-hoc or commonplace intuitions about what a good democratic 
discourse should look like, but grounded in a reading of contemporary normative democratic 
theory (Althaus, 2012).  
In doing so, the study draws attention to the problematic nature of sound-bite 
journalism and provides firm evidence for it. Surely, more work needs to be done to not only 
estimate rates at which public justification in television news suffers from sound-bite 
journalism, but the degree to which this lowers the amount of thinking citizens invest in their 
opinion formation during and after watching the news. For the time being, we may state that 
while sound-bite sizes shrank in the last few decades, a tectonic shift in Western democracies 
may have taken place with regard to the capacity of television news to render substantive 
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justifications to its audiences. Perhaps more generally, we may also state that sound-bite 
journalism emerges from this study as clearly detrimental to news as a purveyor of public 
argument.
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Table 1: Logistic Multilevel Regression Models of Opinion Justification in Television News 
 Opinion justification 
 Model 1: 
Utterance Duration 
Effect 
 Model 2: + 
Utterance Duration 
× Speaker Type 
 B 
(SE) 
AME  B 
(SE) 
AME 
Type of speaker: journalist (base: non-journalist)    -1.09*** 
 (0.15) 
-.233 
Utterance duration (sec) 0.02*** 
(0.00) 
.004  0.05*** 
(0.01) 
.007 
Type of speaker: journalist × Utterance duration (sec)    -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-.007 
-2LL 1834.68  1750.45 
AIC 1862.68  1778.45 
N (broadcast level) 101  101 
N (item level) 329  329 
N (utterance level) 1,559  1,559 
Note: Cell entries are fixed-effects estimates from random-intercept models using mean-variance 
adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature estimation. B (SE) denotes the unstandardized logit coefficient with 
standard error in parentheses; AME denotes the average marginal effect on predicted probabilities; -
2LL denotes -2 log likelihood; AIC denotes the Akaike Information Criterion. a Models 1 & 2 also 
included controls (not shown here) for the national context (Germany/Russia/US; dummy-coded), 
organizational context (commercial/nonprofit), type of speaker (civil society/political center/other; 
dummy-coded), meta-deliberation (yes/no), responsiveness (yes/no), news item type (dialogical vs. 
non-dialogical), decision-relatedness  (yes/no), and opposing positions  (yes/no). Specification of Model 
2 was identical to Model 1, except for an alternative indicator of speaker type and the multiplicative 
interaction term. Empty model (Model 0) fit statistics: -2LL = 1911.30, AIC = 1917.30. Utterance 
duration variable was centered at its mean in Model 2. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed 
tests). 
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Figure 1: Average marginal effects of temporal context on opinion justification in the news, 
overall and journalist versus non-journalist utterances 
Note: Plot a. displays predictive marginal probabilities of opinion justification (with 95% confidence interval 
band based on a normal approximation, using delta-method standard errors) based on Model 1 for all opinion-
presenting utterances (n = 1,559). Plot b. displays predictive marginal probabilities of opinion justification (with 
95% confidence interval bands based on a normal approximation, using delta-method standard errors) based on 
Model 2 for all opinion-presenting utterances by (a) journalists and (b) non-journalists (n = 1,559). For both 
groups, analysis included all primary (“direct”) utterances presenting own or quoted opinion. The interaction 
between type of speaker and utterance duration was statistically significant, z = -4.37, p < .001 (two-tailed). 
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Figure 2: Average marginal effects of temporal context on opinion justification in the news, 
by country 
Note: Plots a.-c. display predictive marginal probabilities of opinion justification (with 95% confidence interval 
bands based on a normal approximation, using delta-method standard errors, out-of-scale values below 0 and 
above 1 trimmed) based on Model 1 for all opinion-presenting utterances by non-journalist speakers in German 
(n = 145), Russian (n = 71), and US-American television news (n = 542).
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 This does not mean that normative democratic theory assumes every public justification to make equally 
valuable contributions to democratic discourse (to state the obvious, justifications can be sincere or insincere, 
truth-seeking or manipulative, and so on). In fact, theorists and journalists alike often note that it is one of the 
key democratic functions of journalism to generate and disseminate public reasons that are both grounded in 
fundamental values (Ettema, 2007) and nonpartisan, accurate, and fair-minded (Schudson, 2013) and thus 
considered in a strong normative sense. Such journalistic consideredness may also set apart the democratic 
quality of contributions to public discourse by journalists themselves, guided as they often are by these values, 
and their sources, who often play a more substantively self-interested role in public debates and may be less 
liable to strong norms of reasonableness. These differences have to be borne in mind when considering the mere 
volume of justification in the news, as this paper does. 
2
 Note that a focus on the effects of utterance duration (sound-bite length) also captures any effects of item and 
broadcast durations on justification in the news that are mediated by utterance duration. A focus on the utterance 
level captures the consequences for justification in the news of a “trickle-down economics of time” in television 
newscasts while avoiding an artificial division of effects (through statistical control) into several levels that 
really are situated on the lowest level (the individual utterance). Importantly, the focus on utterances also avoids 
the risk of underestimating the true effect of utterance durations by subtracting any effect of higher level 
durations that work through them. 
3
 One exception is a study of campaign coverage before the 2009 German national election that found shorter 
opinion utterances to be somewhat less likely to present a reason than their longer counterparts (Weinmann & 
Löb, 2012, p. 78). 
4
 The following news programs were analyzed in this study. German programs: Tagesschau (ARD), 
Tagesthemen (ARD), RTL aktuell (RTL), Nachrichten (n-tv); U.S. programs: PBS NewsHour (PBS), World News 
(ABC), Anderson Cooper 360° (CNN), Fox Report (Fox News Channel); Russian programs: Novosti (Pervy), 
Novosti 24 (REN-TV), Vesti. Seitschas (Rossija 24). For the German public service station ARD, both prime-time 
evening newscasts were analyzed (Tagesschau and Tagesthemen). 
5
 Of the three, Russia represents the most extreme case and at the time of data collection could have also been 
classified in some respects as a repressive authoritarian state. With regard to the media system, however, at the 
time, the commercial Russian channel in the sample, REN-TV, was not yet fully controlled by Russian state 
authorities or affiliates and partly owned by German media corporation Bertelsmann and thus expected to 
operate in an at least partly independent manner (see Online Appendix I). Autonomous, non-state-controlled 
justification in the news should therefore at least not have been completely repressed or otherwise controlled 
during the studied period. 
6
 Because this is an interaction model, this effect is not a standard main effect, but a conditional effect of speaker 
type for an average-length opinion utterance (i.e., the value of the mean-centered utterance variable equals zero) 
(Jaccard, 2001). However, the corresponding standard main effect model (excluding the interaction term) shows 
that the standard (overall) main effect of speaker type is similar in size (AME = -.218, z = -8.08, p < .001). 
